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Non-technical summary
Excess reserves refer to the current account holdings of banks with their central bank beyond required reserves. In the past, excess reserves were regarded as playing the key role in the transmission of monetary policy. Banks were perceived as being more inclined to provide loans when the volumes of excess reserves were high, and less inclined when low. Open market operations were therefore -at least in theory -conducted with the main objective of steering the level of excess reserves. This view on monetary policy implementation was referred to as 'reserve position doctrine' (RPD). This situation has been reversed when central banks returned to more explicit interest rate targeting at the beginning of the 1990s.
In the case of the US, no deposit facility limits the possible amount of excess reserves, an aggregate level simply means driving short-term interest rates to zero (or to the deposit facility rate, if any). The problem with this channel is that (1) it is too radical for normal times; (2) if not deemed to persist over some time, it provides little guidance on the future evolution of short term rates, and therefore fundamentally destabilizes the yield curve and therefore inter-temporal economic decisions by economic agents; (3) it is normally more relevant to describe such a policy measure as the setting of a zero interest rate target, than to define it as an excess reserves target.
Although excess reserves should not play a particular role in monetary macroeconomics, it should not be forgotten that they represent a challenge in the day-to-day implementation of monetary policy, since they constitute an only partially predictable reserve market factor, similarly to other so-called autonomous liquidity factors like for instance the deposits of the Government with the central bank or the volume of banknotes in circulation. This paper hence focuses on explaining to what extent excess reserves are and should be relevant today in the implementation of monetary policy, focusing on the specific case of the operational framework of the Eurosystem. In particular, we study the impact that changes to the operational framework for monetary policy implementation have on the level and volatility of excess reserves.
A simple 'transaction costs' model of excess reserves in the euro area is developed to address these issues. Starting from the observation that in the euro area, excess reserves can in principle always be avoided by recourse to the remunerated deposit facility, transaction costs are modelled as the (low) costs to remain in the office until 18:30, which is the time when the last payments have been settled, and around 90 minutes after the interbank market, in which transactions are initiated, has closed. This model is used to simulate the following policy scenarios: 1) Changing all key ECB interest rates; 2) Modifying the width of the corridor of the standing facility rates; 3) Ending the deposit facility; 4) Changing the penalty rate; 5) Changing banks' reserves requirements; 6) Changing the volatility of payment shocks.
Changes in the volatility of payment shocks can be interpreted as: a) changes in the efficiency of payment systems, b) changes in the volume of payment activities, or c) changes in the smoothness of the functioning of money markets.
The simulation of the model shows not only that excess reserves may increase considerably under some changes of the framework for monetary policy implementation, but also that their volatility and hence unpredictability could. This may cause an increase of the volatility of the overnight rate at the very end of the reserve maintenance period.
Introduction
Excess reserves refer to the current account holdings of banks with their central bank beyond required reserves. In the past, excess reserves were regarded as playing the key role in the transmission of monetary policy. Banks were perceived as being more inclined to provide loans when the volumes of excess reserves were high, and less inclined when low. Open market operations were therefore -at least in theory -conducted with the main objective of steering the level of excess reserves. This view on monetary policy implementation was referred to as 'reserve position doctrine' (RPD). 1 This situation has been reversed when central banks returned to more explicit interest rate targeting at the beginning of the 1990s.
Although it has thus been confirmed that excess reserves should not play a particular role in monetary macroeconomics, it should not be forgotten that they represent a challenge in the day-to-day implementation of monetary policy. A central bank's objective of steering interest rates is achieved by managing the conditions that equilibrate supply and demand in the market for bank reserves. When assessing the liquidity needs of the banking system, it is necessary to take into account the expected value of excess reserves in a similar way as is done for the so-called 'autonomous liquidity factors', e.g. the deposits of the Government with the central bank or the volume of banknotes in circulation.
This paper explains to what extent excess reserves are and should be relevant today in the implementation of monetary policy, focusing on the specific case of the operational framework of the Eurosystem. In particular, we studies the impact that changes to the operational framework for monetary policy implementation have on the level and volatility of excess reserves. A simple 'transaction costs' model of excess reserves in the euro area is developed to address these issues. Starting from the observation that in the euro area, excess reserves can in principle always be avoided by recourse to the remunerated deposit facility, transaction costs are modelled as the (low) costs to remain in the office until 18:30, which is the time when the last payments have been settled, and around 90 minutes after the interbank market, in which transactions are initiated, has closed.
The results show not only that excess reserves may increase considerably under some changes of the framework for monetary policy implementation, but also that their volatility and hence unpredictability could. This would cause an increase of the volatility of the overnight rate at the very end of the reserve maintenance period. The model developed in this paper follows the precautionary demand models of Orr and Mellon (1961) and Poole (1968) that suggested that the demand for excess reserves should decrease with interest rates and increase with the magnitude of payment shocks. This same result was also found for Section 2 provides a general short review of the role of excess reserves in Monetary Policy. Leaving aside the fact that in both cases it does not seem to have helped by itself to create credit expansion, the problem with this channel is that (1) it is too radical for normal times;
(2) if not deemed to persist over some time, it provides little guidance on the future evolution of short term rates, and therefore fundamentally destabilizes the yield curve and therefore inter-temporal economic decisions by economic agents; (3) it is normally more relevant to describe such a policy measure as the setting of a zero interest rate target, than to define it as an excess reserves target.
Although it has thus been confirmed that excess reserves should not play a particular role in monetary macroeconomics, it should not be forgotten that they represent a challenge in the day-to-day implementation of monetary policy, since they constitute an only partially predictable reserve market factor, similarly to other so-called autonomous liquidity factors like for instance the deposits of the Government with the central bank or the volume of banknotes in circulation.
Raison d'être of excess reserves in the euro area
Excess reserves cannot be understood without considering the environment in which they are generated. This environment is determined by the following factors: lump sum allowance of EUR 100,000 is applied to the requirement, and hence a substantial number of small banks ends with effectively zero reserve requirements.
Compliance with reserve requirements is determined on the basis of the average reserve holdings over a maintenance period of one month. Reserve holdings not exceeding the minimum reserve requirements are remunerated at market rates, but excess reserves are not remunerated at all. It should be highlighted that in the present paper the term excess reserves strictly refers to the difference between accumulated reserve holdings, e.g. at day t of the maintenance period the sum of the reserve holdings of days 1 to t, and total reserve requirements, i.e. 2% of short term liabilities multiplied by the number of days in the maintenance period. This averaging system of the euro area implies that banks subject to reserve requirements are unlikely to generate excess reserves for most of the reserve maintenance period. Only towards the end of the reserve maintenance period, when the remaining accumulated reserve requirement to be fulfilled becomes small, the likelihood of generating excess reserves as a result of unanticipated liquidity providing payment shocks increases. liquidity imbalances at the end of the maintenance period, which can then also lead to a significant deviation in the overnight rate from the minimum rate of the main refinancing operation set by the ECB.
C. The structure of the payment system and volume of payment activity. The euro area interbank money market and payment system is characterized overall by a high degree of efficiency and reliability. The reliability of systems implies that it is normally not technical failure of payment systems which generate payment shocks and thus potentially excess reserves, but human mistake in the use of the systems or failure of banks' local IT systems connected to the payment system.
Excess reserves in the US and their treatment in monetary policy implementation were described in detail some time ago by Beek (1981) . Although we will not revisit the patterns of excess reserves in the US, it is worth looking briefly at the main institutional differences to understand what is specific to the euro area. First, reserve requirements are today much lower in the US, where the averaging capacity is less than 10 per cent of the one in the euro area (see e.g. Blenck, Hasko, Hilton, and Masaki (2001)). This should imply that the maintenance period pattern of excess reserves is somewhat weaker in the US, and that excess reserves are overall somewhat higher. Second, there is no deposit facility in the US.
Therefore, also aggregate surpluses of reserves have to end as excess reserves, and not like in the euro area to a large extent as a recourse to the deposit facility. Basically, one could say that the US excess reserves correspond to the sum of excess reserves and the recourse to the deposit facility in the euro area. Of course, the related incentives to banks are somewhat different in the two cases, and therefore, if everything else remained equal, a system with a deposit facility would not generate the same level of excess reserves plus recourse to the deposit facility as a system without a deposit facility would generate excess reserves. Finally, the Fed allows banks to carry-over some reserve deficits or reserve surpluses into the following reserve maintenance period. This specification will contribute to lowering excess reserves in the US as compared to the euro area. The net effect of the mentioned three key differences on the total level of excess reserves can be in either direction, since the first two suggest that excess reserves in the US would be lower, while the last one suggests the opposite.
Excess reserves and complementary euro area data
Excess reserves can be split into two main categories: excess reserves generated by banks that are not obliged to fulfil minimum reserve requirements (X1), and excess reserves generated by banks obliged to fulfil reserve requirements (X2). 
A transaction costs model of excess reserves
There are two calendar related features that render the formulation of our model cumbersome. Namely, i) money markets are closed over the weekend, and ii) the last day of the maintenace period may occur over the weekend. For the sake of clarity we formulate the model ignoring these complications, and leave for the appendix its more complicated 'full' algebraic formulation.
Variable definition
We define T as the total number of days in a maintenance period, and the subindex t = 1, . . . , T will be used to denote a particular day of the maintenance period. For a given bank at time t we further define:
q reserve requirements.
ε t end of day payment shock (liquidity shock). stay'. 4 Note that from the definitions it follows that:
Excess reserves are hence defined as Ψ (s t ); where Ψ (x) is a function that takes the value of
x for x > 0 and the value of 0 otherwise.
Liquidity management framework in the euro area
It further follows from the specific nature of the operational framework of the ECB, and in particular from the operational procedures applied to the two standing facilities that:
where Θ(x) is a function that takes the value of 1 if x ≥ 0 and the value of zero otherwise. Although at first sight equations (4) and (3) appear complicated, they can be easily explained. First, recourse to the deposit facility requires an active decision by a bank, and this explains the term h t in equation (3). Furthermore, the remuneration rate for reserves is higher than the remuneration rate of the deposit facility, and therefore no use will be made of the deposit facility if the reserve holdings count towards reserve requirements, but once they exceed that amount they should be placed in it, or otherwise they will not be remunerated at all. Second, recourse to the marginal lending facility is automatic in the event of negative holdings. Negative holdings trigger an immediate response from the ECB, as no bank is allowed to have an uncollateralised overdraft overnight. Additionally, on the last day of the maintenance period, and if the bank treasurer decides to stay, it pays to avoid the penalty of possible unfulfilled reserve requirements by making use of the marginal lending facility.
Obviously, this is so if the penalty rate exceeds the rate of the marginal lending facility, which is always the case. 
Expected cash flow (CF) of staying or leaving at 17.30
The expected CF related to reserve holdings with the central bank if the treasurer decides to stay or leave is: C t (a, b, c, d) under normality assumptions are provided in the appendix. It then follows that the optimal decision on staying or leaving will depend on which has the largest cash flow, i.e.
Modelling Assumptions
Thus far all equations presented in the paper are linked to the particular nature of the operational framework of the ECB. We now incorporate our first modelling assumptions: No data on the individual banks' end of day liquidity shocks is available, nor do we have data for the payment system activity of banks which could be regarded as a proxy. Assumption 1 implies that liquidity shocks are positively correlated with bank's reserve requirements, reflecting the idea that large banks are exposed to larger liquidity shocks. The parameter α 1 is needed otherwise banks with zero reserve requirements would also have zero shocks. From anecdotal evidence, the distribution of liquidity shocks is likely to exhibit leptokurtosis: this explains the decision to have distribution of shocks with a probability p being zero.
Valimaki (2001) and Perez-Quiros and Rodriguez-Mendizabal (2001) suggested that the exact modelling of optimizing reserve fulfilment behaviour subject to liquidity shocks over an entire reserve maintenance period of 30 days is extremely complex. It is not only difficult to calibrate with data, but is also unlikely to be followed by bank treasurers who often follow simple rules of thumb. Assumption 3 states that banks follow a rather simple and straightforward strategy in their fulfilment of reserve requirements. This assumption together with assumption 4 on precautionary holdings can be formulated into:
Equations (1) to (6) complete the formulation of the model.
Simulation results
Simulation method
We use capital letters to define the euro area aggregate equivalents of those variables defined in section 5 above. 
and where for P a large number, the value of E{Y n,t } is estimated by P
, where Y j n,t is simulated from our model. We define our estimateγ as that γ that solves (7). Using this parameter vectorγ fifty simulations over the same sample period were computed. This provided estimates of the mean and standard deviation of all relevant series.
Simulation results
The estimated parameters are displayed in table 2. The variance of liquidity shocks is composed of two terms: α 1 = 0.019 million of euro and the coefficient α 2 = 0.17 that multiplies the level of required reserves. The surprisingly low fixed term results probably from the high number of banks with zero reserve requirements, which after all do not generate so much excess reserves. Indeed, there are many specialized institutions among those zero reserve requirement banks which are typically not exposed to any stochastic flows of reserves.
For instance, a bank with average required reserves of EUR 17 million would have a variance of shocks of around EUR 25 billion, whereby only in 62% of days such shocks would actually occur, as revealed by the parameter p of 0.38. The cost of staying, δ, is EUR 200, which looks relatively high. However, when taking into account that a recourse to the deposit facility not only requires the presence of one staff member, but also likely some manager and a back office team, then this figure appears plausible. Furthermore, one should note that in the euro area the payment system opens at 8 and money markets are rather active already at 9:00. Therefore, ordinary staff with a maximum 40 hours working week tends to be unwilling to stay until 18:30, and staff presence of that time may therefore require establishing an expensive shift work system. refer to the actual value on the last day of the maintenance period; results for the use of the marginal lending facility (ML) and the use of the deposit facility refer to the average used over the maintenance period. Broadly speaking our model replicates the fact that the level of excess reserves is high while the average use of both standing facilities is low. The value for X2 is 12.7%, and for X1 is 3.26% while the average use of the ML and DF facilities is 0.99% and 0.21% respectively. These values are very similar to those observed in the euro area.
Furthermore, as shown in figure 5 , the daily pattern of the simulated series of excess reserves follows also very closely that of the actual series. It needs to be admitted that the obtained figure for the recourse to the marginal lending facility seems to over-estimate actual recourse (which is only slightly higher than actual recourse to the deposit facility). The fact that end of day liquidity absorbing shocks can force banks already early in the maintenance period into recourse to the marginal lending facility, while the same rarely holds for the deposit facility, makes the actual figures more surprising than the ones obtained in the simulation.
Maybe one reason for the relative similarity of the sizes of the two actual recourses stems from the practice of some banks to use the deposit facility already earlier in the maintenance period in case of liquidity injecting shocks, even if they still have reserve requirements to be fulfilled.
Simulation of policy scenarios
Using the model and the estimated parameters, some scenario analysis was performed to i. Increase all key ECB interest rates by 2%
ii. Decrease all key ECB interest rates by 2%
iii. Narrow symmetrically the corridor set by standing facilities by 100 basis points iv. Widen symmetrically the corridor set by standing facilities by 200 basis points v. Abolish the deposit facility rate (leaving other rates unchanged)
vi. Increase the penalty rate by 5% (leaving other rates unchanged)
vii. Decrease the penalty rate by 2.5% (leaving other rates unchanged)
viii. Increase banks' reserve requirements by 100%
ix. Decrease banks' reserve requirements by 50%
x. Increase the variance payment system shocks by 100%
xi. Decrease the variance payment system shocks by 50%
The different policy scenarios were simulated over the same time horizon, (24 As expected, excess reserves in the category X1 are practically unaffected by the different policy scenarios. However, there is a more significant impact on excess reserves in category X2 and therefore a corresponding impact on total excess reserves.
Scenario i and ii. Increasing all key ECB interest rates by 2% leads to a reduction of around 75% for X2 excess reserves, and its standard deviation decreases proportionally.
This result was to be expected, as increasing interest rates raises the opportunity cost of holding excess reserves and the model predicts that this would increase the likelihood that the treasurer would stay late in the office. Similarly, decreasing all key ECB rates by 2%, i.e. decreasing the opportunity cost of staying in the office, leads to an increase in excess reserves. However, the effect is much stronger than under the previous scenario: total excess reserves increase to 237% of the baseline scenario. This stronger reaction of excess reserves to a lowering of rates suggests a (plausible) convexity in the relationship between rates and excess reserves. The standard deviation also increases significantly and more than
proportionally, reaching 326% of the baseline standard deviation. Hence, excess reserves are likely to become significantly more difficult to forecast when rates fall. Indeed, the ECB 21 ECB Working Paper Series No. 361 May 2004 has recently, after several rate cuts, observed some more non-anticipated elements in excess reserves and a worsening of the performance of its forecasting.
Although the model therefore generates the plausible result that the level of excess reserves is to some extent interest rate dependent, this should not lead to the conclusion that excess reserves play an important role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
A central bank would simply consider the effects of the interest rate level when making its forecasts of the overall need for reserves to ensured balanced liquidity conditions.
Scenario iii and iv. When the corridor of standing facility rates is symmetrically tightened to a width of only 100 basis points (from the actual 200 basis points), excess reserves decline. This mainly reflects the increased level of the deposit facility. The opposite effect is obtained when the corridor is widened to a total of 400 basis points.
Scenario v. Under the fifth scenario, the deposit facility is completely abolished, eliminating any benefit of staying in the office. As expected, excess reserves increase substantially to 392% of the baseline scenario level. The standard deviation of excess reserves increases to more than 900% of the baseline level.
Scenario vi and vii. Changing the penalty rate, however, does not have a significant impact, although it would have been plausible that it increases the incentive of treasurers to stay in the office on the last business day of the maintenance period to ensure they have complied with reserve requirements. Reducing the penalty rate by 2.5% so that it would equal the marginal lending rate and there is effectively no penalty, leads to the expected effect of an increase in excess reserves, although this effect is rather small. To the extent that the ECB disliked such additional volatility, it could make additional efforts to forecast excess reserves. However, one could argue that this volatility of money market rates would remain limited to the shortest maturities and would not be transmitted along the yield curve towards maturities judged relevant for the transmission of monetary policy. In so far, the ECB may also simply accept such additional transitory volatility.
Conclusions
Although excess reserves should not play a particular role in monetary macroeconomics, it should not be forgotten that they represent a challenge in day-to-day monetary policy implementation because they constitute an only partially predictable reserve market factor, similar to other so-called autonomous liquidity factors like for instance the deposits of the Government with the central bank.
A simple transaction cost model of excess reserves presented was able to replicate very well the excess reserves patterns observed, in particular the intra-reserve maintenance period pattern. The model was mainly based on the (low) cost to treasurers of using the deposit facility. This was exemplified by the choice of either bearing a daily cost of staying in the office until money markets close to fine tune the end of day position, or leaving somewhat earlier and letting end of day payment shocks impact on reserve holdings. 
where:
µ t,z is defined as that µ which solves (9) subject to µ ≥ r Note that the ECB rates will not change over the weekend and this is why their corresponding subindexes remain t,z in the formula.
Note that for the above formulas to hold we will adopt the convention of defining r a Recall that variance of the shocks, σ 2 = α 1 + α 2 q, δ is the 'cost of staying'; p is the probability that the shock is zero; β 1 , β 2 are parameters associated with precautionary holdings, i.e. g = β 1 + β 2 q. α 1 , β 1 and δ are in billions euro. 
